The Filipino Today

by Polatenna on Thu, 09/02/2010 – 13:29

Sharing this piece at a time when Filipinos are experiencing sadness,anxiety and shame for the Luneta massacre last Aug.23 that was broadcasted worlwide.

By Alex Lacson

After the August 23 hostage drama, there is just too much negativity
about and against the Filipino.

“It is difficult to be a Filipino these days”, says a friend who works
in Hongkong. “Nakakahiya tayo”, “Only in the Philippines” were some of
the comments lawyer Trixie Cruz-Angeles received in her Facebook.
There is this email supposedly written by a Dutch married to a
Filipina, with 2 kids, making a litany of the supposed stupidity or
idiocy of Filipinos in general. There was also this statement by
Fermi Wong, founder of Unison HongKong, where she said – “Filipino
maids have a very low status in our city”. Then there is this article
from a certain Daniel Wagner of Huffington Post, wherein he said he
sees nothing good in our country’s future.

Clearly, the hostage crisis has spawned another crisis – a crisis of
faith in the Filipino, one that exists in the minds of a significant
number of Filipinos and some quarters in the world.

It is important for us Filipinos to take stock of ourselves as a
people – of who we truly are as a people. It is important that we
remind ourselves who the Filipino really is, before our young children
believe all this negativity that they hear and read about the
Filipino.

We have to protect and defend the Filipino in each one of us.

The August 23 hostage fiasco is now part of us as Filipinos, it being
part now of our country’s and world’s history. But that is not all
that there is to the Filipino. Yes, we accept it as a failure on our
part, a disappointment to HongKong, China and to the whole world.

But there is so much more about the Filipino.

In 1945, at the end of World War II, Hitler and his Nazi had killed
more than 6 million Jews in Europe. But in 1939, when the Jews and
their families were fleeing Europe at a time when several countries
refused to open their doors to them, our Philippines did the highly
risky and the unlikely –thru President Manuel L Quezon, we opened our
country’s doors and our nation’s heart to the fleeing and persecuted
Jews. Eventually, some 1,200 Jews and their families made it to
Manila. Last 21 June 2010, or 70 years later, the first ever monument
honoring Quezon and the Filipino nation for this “open door policy”
was inaugurated on Israeli soil, at the 65-hectare Holocaust Memorial
Park in Rishon LeZion, Israel.

The Filipino heart is one of history’s biggest, one of the world’s
rare jewels, and one of humanity’s greatest treasures.

In 2007, Baldomero M. Olivera, a Filipino, was chosen and awarded as
the Scientist for the Year 2007 by Harvard University Foundation, for
his work in neurotoxins which is produced by venomous cone snails
commonly found in the tropical waters of Philippines. Olivera is a
distinguished professor of biology at University of Utah, USA. The
Scientist for the Year 2007 award was given to him in recognition to
his outstanding contribution to science, particularly to molecular
biology and groundbreaking work with conotoxins. The research
conducted by Olivera’s group became the basis for the production of
commercial drug called Prialt (generic name – Ziconotide), which is
considered more effective than morphine and does not result in
addiction.

The Filipino mind is one of the world’s best, one of humanity’s great assets.

The Filipino is capable of greatness, of making great sacrifices for
the greater good of the least of our people. Josette Biyo is an
example of this. Biyo has masteral and doctoral degress from one of
the top universities in the Philippines – the De La Salle University
(Taft, Manila) – where she used to teach rich college students and was
paid well for it. But Dr Biyo left all that and all the glamour of
Manila, and chose to teach in a far-away public school in a rural area
in the province, receiving the salary of less than US$ 300 a month.
When asked why she did that, she replied “but who will teach our
children?” In recognition of the rarity of her kind, the world-famous
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the United States
honoured Dr Biyo a very rare honor – by naming a small and
new-discovered planet in our galaxy as “Biyo”.

The Filipino is one of humanity’s best examples on the greatness of
human spirit!

Efren Penaflorida was born to a father who worked as a tricycle driver
and a mother who worked as laundrywoman. Through sheer determination
and the help of other people, Penaflorida finished college. In 1997,
Penaflorida and his friends formed a group that made pushcarts
(kariton) and loaded them with books, pens, crayons, blackboard,
clothes, jugs of water, and a Philippine flag. Then he and his group
would go to the public cemetery, market and garbage dump sites in
Cavite City – to teach street children with reading, math, basic
literacy skills and values, to save them from illegal drugs and
prevent them from joining gangs. Penaflorida and his group have been
doing this for more than a decade. Last year, Penaflorida was chosen
and awarded as CNN Hero for 2009.

Efren Penaflorida is one of the great human beings alive today. And he
is a Filipino!

Nestor Suplico is yet another example of the Filipino’s nobility of
spirit. Suplico was a taxi driver In New York. On 17 July 2004,
Suplico drove 43 miles from New York City to Connecticut, USA to
return the US$80,000 worth of jewelry (rare black pearls) to his
passenger who forgot it at the back seat of his taxi. When his
passenger offered to give him a reward, Suplico even refused the
reward. He just asked to be reimbursed for his taxi fuel for his
travel to Connecticut. At the time, Suplico was just earning $80 a day
as a taxi driver. What do you call that? That’s honesty in its purest
sense. That is decency most sublime. And it occurred in New York, the
Big Apple City, where all kinds of snakes and sinners abound, and a
place where – according to American novelist Sydney Sheldon – angels
no longer descend. No wonder all New York newspapers called him “New
York’s Most Honest Taxi Driver”. The New York City Government also
held a ceremony to officially acknowledge his noble deed. The
Philippine Senate passed a Resolution for giving honors to the
Filipino people and our country.

In Singapore, Filipina Marites Perez-Galam, 33, a mother of four,
found a wallet in a public toilet near the restaurant where she works
as the head waitress found a wallet containing 16,000 Singaporean
dollars (US $11,000). Maritess immediately handed the wallet to the
restaurant manager of Imperial Herbal restaurant where she worked
located in Vivo City Mall. The manager in turn reported the lost money
to the mall’s management. It took the Indonesian woman less than two
hours to claim her lost wallet intended for her son’s ear surgery that
she and her husband saved for the medical treatment. Maritess refused
the reward offered by the grateful owner and said it was the right
thing to do.

The Filipina, in features and physical beauty, is one of the world’s
most beautiful creatures! Look at this list – Gemma Cruz became the
first Filipina to win Miss International in 1964; Gloria Diaz won as
Miss Universe in 1969; Aurora Pijuan won Miss International in 1970;
Margie Moran won Miss Universe in 1973; Evangeline Pascual was 1st
runner up in Miss World 1974; Melanie Marquez was Miss International
in 1979; Ruffa Gutierrez was 2nd runner up in Miss World 1993;
Charlene Gonzalez was Miss Universe finalist in 1994; Mirriam Quiambao
was Miss Universe 1st runner up in 1999; and last week, Venus Raj was
4th runner up in Miss Universe pageant.

I can cite more great Filipinos like Ramon Magsaysay, Ninoy Aquino,
Leah Salonga, Manny Pacquaio, Paeng Nepomuceno, Tony Meloto, Joey
Velasco, Juan Luna and Jose Rizal. For truly, there are many more
great Filipinos who define who we are as a people and as a nation –
each one of them is part of each one of us, for they are Filipinos
like us, for they are part of our history as a people.

What we see and hear of the Filipino today is not all that there is
about the Filipino. I believe that the Filipino is higher and greater
than all these that we see and hear about the Filipino. God has
beautiful story for us as a people. And the story that we see today is
but a fleeting portion of that beautiful story that is yet to fully
unfold before the eyes of our world.

So let’s rise as one people. Let’s pick up the pieces. Let’s ask for
understanding and forgiveness for our failure. Let us also ask for
space and time to correct our mistakes, so we can improve our system.

To all of you my fellow Filipinos, let’s keep on building the Filipino
great and respectable in the eyes of our world – one story, two
stories, three stories at a time – by your story, by my story, by your
child’s story, by your story of excellence at work, by another
Filipino’s honesty in dealing with others, by another Pinoy’s example
of extreme sacrifice, by the faith in God we Filipinos are known for.

Every Filipino, wherever he or she maybe in the world today, is part
of the solution. Each one of us is part of the answer. Every one of us
is part of the hope we seek for our country. The Filipino will not
become a world-class citizen unless we are able to build a world-class
homeland in our Philippines.

We are a beautiful people. Let no one in the world take that beauty
away from you. Let no one in the world take away that beauty away from
any of your children! We just have to learn – very soon – to build a
beautiful country for ourselves, with an honest and competent
government in our midst.

Mga kababayan, after reading this, I ask you to do two things.

First, defend and protect the Filipino whenever you can, especially
among your children. Fight all this negativity about the Filipino that
is circulating in many parts of the world. Let us not allow this
single incident define who the Filipino is, and who we are as a
people. And second, demand for good leadership and good government
from our leaders. Question both their actions and inaction; expose the
follies of their policies and decisions. The only way we can perfect
our system is by engaging it. The only way we can solve our problem,
is by facing it, head on.

We are all builders of the beauty and greatness of the Filipino. We
are the architects of our nation’s success.

To all the people of HK and China, especially the relatives of the
victims, my family and I deeply mourn with the loss of your loved
ones. Every life is precious. My family and I humbly ask for your
understanding and forgiveness.

GODBLESS US ALL.

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The Importance of Strict Compliance of the Inventory and Chain of Custody Provision of RA 9165

The Supreme Court came out with a Ruling of a case pertaining to sale of drugs.  This was a clarification of earlier rulings of the highest court of the land relative to the conduct of inventory of the confiscated items and the proof of the chain of custody of the said items leading to the presentation of the said object evidences in court.  To read the original case in full please click on the following link: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/179029.htm

To appraise you of the Court Ruling that would interest the readers to read the case in full, the dispositive portion is quoted verbatim below:

THE COURT’S RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the police complied with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act.

The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act: A Brief Background

R.A. No. 9165 was enacted in 2002 to pursue the State’s policy to “safeguard the integrity of its territory and the well-being of its citizenry particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-being, and to defend the same against acts or omissions detrimental to their development and preservation.”

R.A. No. 9165 repealed and superseded R.A. No. 6425, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Realizing that dangerous drugs are one of the most serious social ills of the society at present, Congress saw the need to further enhance the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs. The new law thus mandates the government to pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances through an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and projects.^[1][25]

Illegal Sale of Drugs under Section 5 vis-à-vis the Inventory and Photograph Requirement under Section 21

In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.^[2][26] To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.^[3][27]

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]

Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drug’s unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.^[4][28] The records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing that the buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure despite its mandatory terms. The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the trial:

PROSECUTOR [EMERSON TURINGAN]:

Q: After you handed this buy-bust money to the accused, what happened next?

[PO3 ALMAREZ:]

A: When the shabu was already with me and I gave him the money[,] I signaled the two, Captain Jaime de Vera and SPO1 Balido, sir.

x x x x

Q: After you gave that signal, what happened?

A: Then they approached us and helped me in arresting Felimon Pagaduan, sir.

Q: After Pagaduan was arrested, what happened next?

A: After arresting Pagaduan[,] we brought him directly in Diadi Police Station, sir.

Q: What happened when you brought the accused to the Police Station in Diadi?

A: When we were already in Diadi Police Station, we first put him in jail in the Municipal Jail of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.

Q: What did you do with the shabu?

A: The request for laboratory examination was prepared and was brought to the Crime Lab. of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.

x x x x

Q: After making the request, what did you do next[,] if any[,] Mr. Witness?

A: After submission of the request to the Crime Lab.[,] we prepared our joint affidavit for submission of the case to the Court, sir.^[5][29]

From the foregoing exchanges during trial, it is evident that the apprehending team, upon confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the appellant and the seized items to the police station, and, once there, made the request for laboratory examination. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and an elective official. PO3 Almarez, on cross-examination, was unsure and could not give a categorical answer when asked whether he issued a receipt for the shabu confiscated from the appellant.^[6][30] At any rate, no such receipt or certificate of inventory appears in the records.

In several cases, we have emphasized the importance of compliance with the prescribed procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs. We have repeatedly declared that the deviation from the standard procedure dismally compromises the integrity of the evidence. In People v. Morales,^[7][31] we acquitted the accused for failure of the buy-bust team to photograph and inventory the seized items, without giving any justifiable ground for the non-observance of the required procedures. People v. Garcia^[8][32] likewise resulted in an acquittal because no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules. In Bondad, Jr. v. People,^[9][33] we also acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized items, without justifiable grounds.

We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez,^[10][34] People v. Denoman,^[11][35] People v. Partoza,^[12][36] People v. Robles,^[13][37] and People v. dela Cruz,^[14][38] where we emphasized the importance of complying with the required mandatory procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence. For this reason, the last sentence of the implementing rules provides that “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]” Thus, noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case; police procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.^[15][39]

In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to justify the failure of the police to conduct the required physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs. The apprehending team failed to show why an inventory and photograph of the seized evidence had not been made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police station (as required by the Implementing Rules in case of warrantless arrests). We emphasize that for the saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had been preserved.^[16][40] In other words, the justifiable ground for noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.^[17][41]

The “Chain of Custody” Requirement

Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti – the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.^[18][42]

Black’s Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise:

In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the narcotics in a trial of drug case, must account for the custody of the evidence from the moment in which it reaches his custody until the moment in which it is offered in evidence, and such evidence goes to weight not to admissibility of evidence. Com. V. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335.

Likewise, Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 which implements R.A. No. 9165 defines “chain of custody” as follows:

“Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]

In Malillin v. People,^[19][43] the Court explained that the chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.

In the present case, the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen seized from the appellant.

The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the heat-sealed plastic sachet from the appellant. PO3 Almarez mentioned on cross-examination that he placed his initials on the confiscated sachet “after apprehending” the appellant. Notably, this testimony constituted the totality of the prosecution’s evidence on the marking of the seized evidence. PO3 Almarez’s testimony, however, lacked specifics on how he marked the sachet and who witnessed the marking. In People v. Sanchez, we ruled that the “marking” of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. In the present case, nothing in the records gives us an insight on the manner and circumstances that attended the marking of the confiscated sachet. Whether the marking had been done in the presence of the appellant is not at all clear from the evidence that merely mentioned that the evidence had been marked after the appellant’s apprehension.

The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from the apprehending team to the police station. PO3 Almarez testified that the appellant was brought to the Diadi Police Station after his arrest. However, he failed to identify the person who had control and possession of the seized drug at the time of its transportation to the police station. In the absence of clear evidence, we cannot presume that PO3 Almarez, as the poseur buyer, handled the seized sachet – to the exclusion of others – during its transfer from the place of arrest and confiscation to the police station. The prosecution likewise failed to present evidence pertaining to the identity of the duty desk officer who received the plastic sachet containing shabu from the buy-bust team. This is particularly significant since the seized specimen was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory only after two days. It was not, therefore, clear who had temporary custody of the seized items during this significant intervening period of time. Although the records show that the request for laboratory examination of the seized plastic sachet was prepared by Captain de Vera, the evidence does not show that he was the official who received the marked plastic sachet from the buy-bust team.

As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the seized specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to the PNP Crime Laboratory on December 29, 2003, where it was received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined by PSI Quintero. However, the person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory was not identified. As earlier discussed, the identity of the duty desk officer who received the shabu, as well as the person who had temporary custody of the seized items for two days, had not been established.

The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in the chain of custody, creating a reasonable doubt whether the drugs confiscated from the appellant were the same drugs that were brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and eventually offered in court as evidence. In the absence of concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold, the body of the crime – the corpus delicti – has not been adequately proven.^[20][44] In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating reasonable doubt on the appellant’s criminal liability.

Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties

In sustaining the appellant’s conviction, the CA relied on the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive.^[21][45] It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. In the present case, the failure of the apprehending team to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act effectively negates this presumption. As we explained in Malillin v. People:^[22][46]

The presumption of regularity is merely just that – a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.

We are not unmindful of the pernicious effects of drugs in our society; they are lingering maladies that destroy families and relationships, and engender crimes. The Court is one with all the agencies concerned in pursuing an intensive and unrelenting campaign against this social dilemma. Regardless of how much we want to curb this menace, we cannot disregard the protection provided by the Constitution, most particularly the presumption of innocence bestowed on the appellant. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome this constitutional presumption. If the prosecution has not proved, in the first place, all the elements of the crime charged, which in this case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant deserves no less than an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the May 22, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01597. Appellant Felimon Pagaduan y Tamayo is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

[1][25] Integrity of Evidence in Dangerous Drugs Cases by Justice (ret.) Josue N. Bellosillo, 596 SCRA 278 (2009).

[2][26] People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259, 266.

[3][27] See People v. Denoman, G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 257, 267.

[4][28] People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010.

[5][29] TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 9-13.

[6][30] TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 17-18.

[7][31] G.R. No. 172873, March 19, 2010.

[8][32] Supra note 26.

[9][33] G.R. No. 173804, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 497.

[10][34] G.R. No. 179213, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 92.

[11][35] Supra note 27.

[12][36] G.R. No. 182418, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 809.

[13][37] G.R. No. 177220, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 647.

[14][38] G.R. No. 181545, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 273.

[15][39] People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 212.

[16][40] See People v. Almorfe, G.R. No. 181831, March 29, 2010.

[17][41] People v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010.

[18][42] Supra note 39, citing People v. Kimura, 428 SCRA 51 (2004) and Lopez v. People, 553 SCRA 619 (2008).

[19][43] G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 632.

[20][44] Supra note 28.

[21][45] See People v. Coreche, G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 350, 364.

[22][46] Supra note 43, at 623.

The Supreme Court had decided a case on Appeal which case was  successfully prosecuted by the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of La Union, Philippines at the sala of Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, Philippines, laying down principles regarding warrantless search of a moving vehicle, effect of non compliance with Section 21 of the law when not raised at the earliest possible time as an issue, among others.

The case is selected to be posted in this blog site considering that  it is a case that the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of La Union is proud of. Kudos to the fellow prosecutor who successfully prosecuted the case.

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Appellee,

- versus -

BELEN MARIACOS,

Appellant.

G.R. No. 188611

Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

PEREZ,* JJ.

Promulgated:

June 16, 2010

x————————————————————————————x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed as follows:

“That on or about the 27^th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit or authority from the proper government agency or office.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”

When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon:

“1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information as Belen Mariacos;

2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;

3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted from a passenger jeepney;

4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused contained in two (2) bags were submitted for examination to the Crime Lab;

5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted for examination gave positive result for the presence of marijuana;

6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic) and submitted for examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;

7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by the accused; and

8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the accused family (sic): Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena Carino.”

During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:

On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc (“PO2 Pallayoc”), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic).

At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an “O.K.” marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an “O.K.” marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got away.

PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered.

Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.

When it was accused-appellant’s turn to present evidence, she testified that:

On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang (“Lao-ang”), her neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded later when she was told that she would only be carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the police station. When they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police station that accused-appellant discovered the true contents of the bags which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the bags and that she did not know what were contained in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a Counter-Affidavit.[3]

On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court personnel and media.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in considering the evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility.[5] She claimed that her right against an unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that PO2 Pallayoc’s purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was no probable cause for her arrest.[6]

Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime.[7] She alleged that the apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The said regulation directs the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the identity of the items allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to prove that the items allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of custody over the same.

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and legal,[8] justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information from their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana.[9] The OSG also argued that appellant was now estopped from questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of “not guilty” upon arraignment and participated in the trial and presented her evidence.[10] The OSG brushed aside appellant’s argument that the bricks of marijuana were not photographed and inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel immediately after confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever was practicable.[11]

In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellant’s appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in toto.[12] It held that the prosecution had successfully proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of bags which, when inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of “carrying and conveying” the bag that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellant’s warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated:

It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana was on board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-appellant carrying the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.

x x x x

Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.

Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has been trying to intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.

Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use because the motor vehicle had already left the locality.[13]

Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.

Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the State’s agents to conduct searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down the rules on searches and seizures, providing, more or less, clear parameters in determining which are proper and which are not.

Appellant’s main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence used against her. She claims that her constitutional right against unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer.

Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been probable cause for the warrantless arrest of appellant.

Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;

(d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[14]

Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the search was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.

Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.[15]

In People v. Bagista,[16] the Court said:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.[17] Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested.[18]

Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.[19]

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.[20]

Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.[21]

This exception is easy to understand.  A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure.  But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.[22]

Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.

It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellant’s arrest, the police received information that marijuana was to be transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.

This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.[23]

For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a)  When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b)  When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c)  When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.[24]

Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.[25]

Given that the search was valid, appellant’s arrest based on that search is also valid.

Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:

SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no consequence.

When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.[26]

Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this case.[27] Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.[28]

Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed not against particular individuals, but against public order.[29]

Jurisprudence defines “transport” as “to carry or convey from one place to another.”[30] There is no definitive moment when an accused “transports” a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act.[31] The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached.[32]

Moreover, appellant’s possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the disputable presumption[33] that she is the owner of the packages and their contents.[34] Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.

Appellant’s narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the packages contained and where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran after him to give him the bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey without knowing where they were taking the bags.

Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In particular, she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to follow the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of that crime.[35]

Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and disposition of seized dangerous drugs, to wit:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her to the police station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor to witness the opening of the bags seized from appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front of appellant and the other police officers. The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while the plastic bag yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops.[36] PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley Campit then marked the same. Then the seized items were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.[37]

Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellant’s arrest, she was immediately brought to the police station where she stayed while waiting for the Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter marked and sent to the police crime laboratory the following day. Contrary to appellant’s claim, the prosecution’s evidence establishes the chain of custody from the time of

appellant’s arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.

While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellant’s arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial.[38] Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.

Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.[39]

In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellant’s guilt. Thus, her conviction must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza per Raffle dated February 22, 2010.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-13.

[2] CA rollo, pp. 13-29.

[3] Rollo, pp. 2-5.

[4] CA rollo, p. 29.

[5] Id. at 45.

[6] Id. at 48.

[7] Id. at 50.

[8] Id. at 108.

[9] Id. at 112.

[10] Id. at 113.

[11] Id. at 114-115.

[12] Rollo, p. 13.

[13] Id. at 8-9.

[14] People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879-880 (1998). (Citations omitted.)

[15] Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 118, 126 (1999), citing Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430 (1996); and People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991).

[16] G.R. No. 86218, September 18, 1992, 214 SCRA 63, 68-69. (Citations omitted.)

[17] People v. Aruta, supra note 14, at 880.

[18] Except when the prohibited items are in plain view.

[19] People v. Aruta, supra note 14, at 880, citing People v. Encinada, 345 Phil. 301 (1997).

[20] People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 632 (1999).

[21] People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra note 15, at 128-129, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); People v. Del Mundo, 418 Phil. 740 (2001).

[22] Salvador v. People, 502 Phil. 60, 72 (2005).

[23] Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 126.

[24] Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 113.

[25] People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, citing People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752 (2003).

[26] People v. Del Mundo, supra note 21, at 751. (Citations omitted.)

[27] Id., citing People v. Sy Bing Yok, 309 SCRA 28, 38 (1999).

[28] People v. Beriarmente, 418 Phil. 229, 239 (2001).

[29] People v. Doria, supra note 20, at 618. (Citations omitted.)

[30] People v. Peñaflorida, G.R. No. 175604, April 10, 2008, 551 SCRA 111, 125.

[31] People v. Jones, 343 Phil. 865, 877 (1997).

[32] People v. Correa, G.R. No. 119246, January 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 679, 700.

[33] Section 3 (j) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court states:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.—The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

x x x x

(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.

[34] See People v. Del Mundo, supra note 21.

[35] People v. Kimura, 471 Phil. 895, 909 (2004), citing People v. Mendiola, 235 SCRA 116, 120 (1994).

[36] CA rollo, p. 16.

[37] People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 421, 436-437, citing People v. Del Monte, 552 SCRA 627 (2008).

[38] See People v. Pringas, G.R. No. 175928, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828; People v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 171019, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 633.

[39] People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 175326, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 198, 223.

THOSE HAPPY TIMES WITH ROLLIE

ROLLIE MODESTO LAIGO, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of La Union, is seen on the left, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor SOLOMON AÑONUEVO on the right and Associate Provincial Prosecutor BONIFACIO MANGIBIN behind Bong Solomon.  The video was taken while the delegation of Prosecutors of La Union were on board of a motorboat  going to Hundred Islands of Alaminos City, Pangasinan to attend the REGIONAL STAFF MEETING conducted by the Office of the Regional Prosecutor, Region 1 on June 25, 2010.

Today, Rollie Laigo is fighting for his life at the ICU of Lorma Hospital  in San Fernando City, La Union.  He suffered a stroke last July3, 2010.  Rollie and his family need our prayers.  Financial help is welcomed as his  hospital bill is rising.

MONTHLY MEETINGS AND SOCIALIZATION

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union had conducted its monthly meetings and Christmas programs on regular basis.  Its head, Provincial Prosecutor DANILO C. BUMACOD always sees to it that everybody attends such meetings.  Below are several pictures taken during socialization and actual conduct of the meetings:

Dodong aka Ka Kiko

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

Operation “Hello Garci”

THE PRESENT AS HISTORY:
A NARRATION AND INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS
By Gonzalo M. Jurado, Ph.D.

The Landscape

Remember the “Hello Garci” Tapes and the hysteria they created that threatened to rend the national society apart? That was June 2005.

The events unleashed in those days by the playing of the tapes which indicated a woman, said to be President Arroyo, and a man, said to be Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, talking about numerical details of the presidential election sparked the resignation of the so-called Hyatt 10 and their demand for the President’s own resignation. These officials, some of them of Cabinet rank, were joined by a wide band of political and business groups and individuals including a Liberal Party Faction, the United Opposition, the Makati Business Club, and former Presidents Corazon Aquino and Joseph Estrada, Senate President Franklin Drilon, Senators Aquilino Pimentel and Panfilo Lacson, all demanding not just the President’s immediate resignation but her impeachment as well.

A few weeks earlier, Sen. Jingoy Estrada had announced on the floor of the Senate, with absolute certainty, that Mrs Arroyo’s days in the presidency “were numbered.”

The bulk of the media, broadsheet and television, raised the clamor for the President’s resignation or impeachment to hysterical pitch.

Only the intervention of former President Fidel V. Ramos, Speaker Jose de Venecia, and members of Leagues of Local Government Units, who individually and collectively affirmed their support for the President, saved the day for GMA.

As events unfolded, somebody had wiretapped the President in violation of the law against wiretapping. It was said that a member of the Armed Forces, T Sgt Vidal Doble, did it. After investigating the matter, Armed Forces Headquarters concluded that the armed services did not have the technical capability to do that kind of job.

Further, the adverse information about the workings of the Philippine Government that served as cannon fodder for the political opposition had been delivered to them directly by a Philippine-born US marine working in the White House by the name of Leandro Aragoncillo and, in some cases, indirectly through a former assistant of Senator Lacson, Michael Ray Aquino, who had fled to the United States to escape indictment in connection with the Dacer-Corbito murder case. The material had been prepared by the US Embassy in Manila.

In the days that followed, Garcillano, who had gone into hiding, surfaced and appeared before a House of Representatives investigating committee, admitting that he indeed had talked to politicians – to the President once and to others including members of the opposition many times. In response, Congressman Francis Escudero admitted that he had talked to Garcillano during the election period not for himself but on behalf of a constituent. In addition, Congressmen Escudero and Rolex Suplico acknowledged that one day during this period of political turmoil they had visited the US Embassy.

Questions

Even before the tumult had died down and continuing to this day, many observers of the national scene have been asking such questions as:

(1) Could the political and economic forces that got together on that day of June 2005 to unanimously demand the resignation or impeachment of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo have come together by accident or where they organized and coordinated by an Unseen Hand? The diversity of the anti-GMA forces on the one hand and the uniformity of their demand and timing of their actions on the other seem to rule out spontaneous combustion.

(2) How could Leandro Aragoncillo, a US marine whose financial future was assured, or any sensible human being for that matter, have been so short-sighted and so reckless as to jeopardize his lifetime security by violating his government’s State Secrecy Act through delivery of information to anti-government politicians in a foreign land, who were not even in power?

(3) How explain the breadth and depth of the vilification campaign against the President, mobilizing not just the opposition politicians and the anti-Gloria newspapers and television stations but also a business club, an opinion survey entity, leftists groups, and even a few academics acknowledged for their principled championship of nationalist anti-imperialist causes?

Answers

To find an answer to these questions, one has to go back to Angelo dela Cruz (remember him?), the OFW captured by Iraqi militants and threatened to be beheaded if the Philippine contingent in Iraq was not withdrawn. The Philippines had earlier joined George W. Bush’s “Coalition of the Willing” and sent a small contingent to Iraq. Facing an issue of political commitment versus human life, GMA opted for the latter, withdrawing the Philippine contingent to save the life of Angelo dela Cruz. That was July 2004.

This is where the dog is buried. George W. Bush was “dismayed” by the withdrawal. Thereupon, the Bush Administration through its Central Intelligence Agency launched what can be called the Aragoncillo Project, a program of destabilization and vilification aimed at the overthrow of the Arroyo government, mobilizing as its tools everybody in the Philippines that had an axe to grind against GMA.

Was the gathering of the motley group of politicians and businessmen, rightists and leftists, on that day in June 2005 accidental? Who could have done so efficient an orchestration? Was Aragoncillo reckless? Now we know.

It was at about this time that the US government appointed Ambassador to the Philippines – hold your breath — a former CIA agent. Not long after her arrival, the Ambassador called on President Arroyo and Senate President Drilon on separate occasions. Press statements from the US Embassy released after each visit indicated, when compared, that the Ambassador spent time with the President that was less than one-half that spent with the Senate President. This is standard CIA way of degrading anyone that does not meet its approval.

Thenceforward, with diplomatic niceties out of the way, the Ambassador wasted no time in travelling on sorties to far-flung communities of her country of assignment, distributing goods to poverty-stricken groups, delivering little speeches to rural crowds. These were no innocent acts of charity as the media made them out to be. These were authentic CIA tactics of political interference – in this instance designed to alienate the Philippine government under President Arroyo from its constituencies.

George W. Bush himself made a personal contribution to the destabilization campaign. On meeting GMA in the halls of the United Nations in New York in September 2005, he made big water of the employment of a Filipina chef in the White House when he could easily have referred to somewhat less trivial state-related matters. If the world did not notice the insult, it was because GMA overshadowed it by her masterful chairmanship of a United Nations General Assembly Meeting at that time.

In July 2007, Aragoncillo was meted by a US federal court a 10-year sentence for stealing and passing on secret US documents. In the Philippines we call this moro-moro. Michael Ray Aquino was sentenced to six years and four months in prison, too harsh a sentence for a forced accomplice.

More recently, the failure of President Barack Obama to receive GMA on several occasions, explained by Washington people as arising from his heavy schedules, was a deliberate snub intended to remind GMA – and the Philippines– that Uncle Sam remains profoundly displeased over the Philippine government’s failure to stand by the US in Iraq.

And so the destabilization and vilification campaign against GMA rages on, carried out by politicians, businessmen, newspapers and television stations, an opinion survey firm, individuals from left and right, some academics, all of them associating every conceivable wrong-doing with the President. The US ambassador’s political interference continues unabated.

A Comment

It’s been five and a half years since the redemption of Angelo de la Cruz, what conclusion can we derive from the events that transpired over that period of time? Two conclusions. The first is that the destabilization and vilification campaign has succeeded in projecting the President as guilty of all charges of wrong doing, alienating the President from many of her people, as gleefully chronicled by an opinion survey firm day after day. Though a case can be made that GMA is one of our better presidents, some people are convinced she is the worst. In terms of its over-arching objective of toppling the Arroyo government, however, the destabilization and vilification campaign has miserably failed. There are reasons for this.

One, the campaign lacked popular support, Remember the hundreds of thousands of people that the United Opposition promised to bring into Makati to protest GMA’s mandate that never came? Or former President Corazon Aquino’s attempt to rouse another People Power, through a prayer vigil supporting some Fort Bonifacio mutineers, that people simply ignored? Or Sen. Pimentel’s repetitious call for snap elections that fell on deaf ears? Remember how the sidewalk crowds of Makati disdainfully turned their noses up to the Peninsula putschists when these tried to entice the crowds to join them, exposing these putschists’ isolation from the public?

Two, the political opposition, as excellent as it was in its brand of Parliamentary practice, suffered from what can be called litigational infirmity, the lack of ability to back up allegation with evidence or proof. As a consequence, whatever issue it raised, many reasonable people dismissed as plain politicking. The continuous carping, however, did produce a good result for some of the critics: it got them elected to the Senate.

This technical incompetence must be supplemented by the physical cowardice of the military ringleaders who identified themselves with the destabilization effort. Their pathetic surrender at the Peninsula even before a single APC could enter the hotel lobby reduced the whole destabilization program to a comical and ridiculous enterprise.

And three, the media outlets that supported the anti-Gloria crusade did so with such arrogance and self-righteousness they only succeeded in undermining their own cause. As some independent-minded observers wondered, how could these media outlets be so sanctimonious in their judgments when they were merely pushing forward their owners’ interest?

The second conclusion is that some of our leaders in politics and business and many of our opinion makers in media did not mind selling their country down the river, performing the role of stooges of a foreign power, so long as it promoted their personal ambitions. More normally functioning countries have a way of dealing with such behavior as this.

In summary, it must be galling, with Big Brother calling the shots at that, to have thrown at your opponent everything including the kitchen sink and the kitchen itself to destroy her, to have exposed your most meticulously hidden secret for the sake of overthrowing her, only to see her still standing, as strong as ever.

The President continues to preside over the affairs of our country, pushing its development as she sees fit. By all indications, she will remain in office until her term expires, on June 30, 2010.

Dr. Jurado is Vice-President for Finance and Development and concurrently Professor of Economics of Kalayaan College. In this essay he advances of recent events an interpretation that has far-reaching implications to the political sovereignty of our country. Posted by Dodong aka Ka Kiko at 5:44 AM 0 comments

Sunday, December 13, 2009

Martial Law in Maguindanao

http://abpquevedo.blogspot.com/
Saturday, December 12, 2009

After Martial Law in Maguindanao, What?

Deeply rooted in Maguindanao is a culture of dominant clan power. A false reading of the situation results in a truncated view of Maguindanao political history. This view sees the phenomenon as the product of one government period, the decade of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Arguably a greater share of the blame could be laid at the door of the present government. But the culture of dominant and changing local power has been with us in the once “empire province of Cotabato,” which included the present Maguindanao, since at least the 1950s. To my knowledge, no government from the 1950s to the present did anything serious to root this out. In the past 60 years, all governments and many politicians from all parties wanting to get votes have cultivated this culture and ignored the periodic violence that erupted. It was a case of mutual political exploitation and expediency. We ourselves, ordinary citizens, have kept quiet in the past 60 years and learned the art of accommodation.

But of course criticism of Martial Law in Maguindanao is really based on total distrust of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Survey after survey is paraded to say that this is the pulse of the people. The stand of small protesting “militant” groups is given disproportionate media exposure. Political oppositionists and personalities from “militant” organizations are interviewed again and again to give their expected negative views on actions of government. In a very real sense the extraordinary amount of media exposure that is given to the opposition in Manila provides a distorted view of the country as a whole…

Martial Law by its nature as a last resort should be of short duration. But precisely because of its brevity, the following will result: one clan will be significantly disarmed; the balance of political and armed power will shift to other clans; private armies will remain though possibly less visible and probably more sophisticated in behavior; the deep trauma resulting from the massacre will persist; rido is not going to be stopped; the legislative, justice, and executive–and electoral–mechanisms will still be in the hands of those related to or have debts of gratitude to various families; and if a member of the rival clan will somehow gain the top post of the province, do we in Maguindanao really believe that the provincial capitol will remain in Shariff Aguak? Even the peace process will be affected by the loyalties of local rebel commanders to their own clans. Hence, the fundamental dysfunctions in Maguindanao will remain after Martial Law.

What do I see as a possible solution? Even now sentiments are strong in Central and southern Mindanao that elections for local offices in Maguindanao should be deferred. Or at least the term of Martial Law should be extended till after the elections. The fundamental suggestion is for us to move forward from partisan political criticism to collective constructive thinking and effective action on this central issue of Maguindanao dysfunction. I respectfully address this to all concerned, particularly the Senate, House of Representatives, the judicial branch and the Arroyo administration, as well as to all of us Maguindanawons.

+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
December 11, 2009 Posted by Dodong aka Ka Kiko at 11:42 PM 0 comments

Tuesday, December 1, 2009

Private armies and the insurgency

By-product
FIRST PERSON
By Alex Magno
(The Philippine Star)
Updated November 28, 2009 12:00 AM

The standing estimate is that the Ampatuan clan has 800 men (!) under arms. That virtual army is maintained largely at the expense of the state. Government armed and paid allowances to most of these men: a private army operating under the cover of “civilian volunteers” useful for containing the insurgency in the region.

Until this chilling tragedy (in Maguindanao) happened, the authorities found the arrangement concerning “civilian volunteers” a largely functional one. A trade-off was adopted early in the game, many presidencies ago.

Since the AFP did not have enough men and equipment to effectively contain the armed secessionist groups in the area, the “civilian volunteers” functioned as force extenders. In the case of Maguindanao, the “civilian volunteers” were very useful. They kept the MILF trapped in the Maranao areas, with the Maguindanao-speaking areas relatively free of insurgents.

There is a price to pay for that: government tacitly condoned warlords who did their best to contribute to suppressing the insurgency. This has been the unspoken arrangement since the days when these “civilian volunteers” were called BSDUs and then CAFGUs.

The “civilian volunteers” in Maguindanao province provided a crucial buffer, keeping the insurgent groups away from the productive plantations, tuna industries and bustling urban economies to the south. The occasional abuses committed by the warlords, until this week, were a small price to pay for the strategic role of keeping the Maguindanao area and those to the south of the province free of insurgency.

In a way, government had little choice. There was not enough money to enlarge the army so that it achieves an effective ratio of superiority over the secessionist guerrilla forces and the isolated communist gangs. “Civilian volunteers” might be a band-aid solution to a strategic vulnerability, but it was the best that could be done.

This is the complex structure of considerations underpinning Gibo Teodoro’s statement that the only way we can get rid of private armies is to enlarge the army. That is a statement made boldly and frankly — even at the risk of many voters failing to get the point.

Gibo Teodoro should know what the complex considerations are. He served an exemplary two years as defense secretary.

The warlords were not about to squander the leverage they enjoyed. They used the private armies to consolidate their local power bases and occasionally pleased their patrons in Manila by delivering votes in their favor. Still, the existence of these private armies is a by-product of a strategic vulnerability of the state, not just the administration.

Until we have enough money to invest in greater military capability to contain a well-armed insurgent movement, we will have to rely on the cheap repressive labor contributed by “civilian volunteers” organized by local warlords…

But something truly disastrous has happened. The arrangement will now have to be abrogated. What that means is that the civilian volunteer groups need to be disbanded, the offending local tyrants made to face the full weight of the law, and the military, although already thinly spread out, must be redeployed to cover the vacuum…

In the wake of this tragedy, the only guys who have anything to cheer about are the insurgent groups and their allied criminal and terrorist gangs. That is the greatest misfortune of this whole thing. Posted by Dodong aka Ka Kiko at 1:32 AM 0 comments

Sunday, November 8, 2009

A lethal combination of media and politics

The Kris and Noynoy show on ABS-CBN
FROM A DISTANCE
By Carmen N. Pedrosa
(The Philippine Star)
Updated November 07, 2009 12:00 AM

For some background. In the 70s I wrote a book The Untold Story of Imelda Marcos. It was a straightforward narration of Imelda’s life before she became the First Lady. Marcos and Imelda tried to suppress the book and I had to decide whether I would go on with the book or give it up in the face of extreme pressure and harassment. It became a question of freedom. I chose to go on with the book and began a journey that would lead me from housewife to politics to exile and back at the end of the Marcos years.

While in exile in London, we joined the opposition’s fight to regain democracy. Democrats partnered with vested interests and formed a community to oppose the Marcos dictatorship. At the center of that movement was Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino whose journey turned him from an ambitious politician to become a martyr when he was assassinated in 1983. It was serious stuff. When his widow, Cory Aquino took up the mantle after his assassination, the expectation was she would lead the movement towards reforms not only in the Filipino body politic but in society as well. Alas she was not up to it. She was, they said, a victim of her own class and despite her good intentions, unable to lead the political reform and moral regeneration among Filipinos inspired by the struggle against a dictatorship. Her powerful supporters were amply rewarded and we returned to the pre-martial law status quo.

* * *

(With this background in mind, it) is easy to dismiss the whole she-bang (of the Kris and Noynoy show on ABS-CBN) as showbiz and regarded as just another movie script. The story begins with Cory’s well-attended funeral and its transformation into a political cause for Noynoy’s candidacy and his election as president. It has its appeal and none more strident than ABS-CBN’s Boto Mo, Ipatrol Mo, Ako ang Simula.

Fine. By all means, guard the votes but who and what are we voting for? Those questions seem to have been left out. If it were for someone who would lead us, truly lead us, then it is a meaningful advocacy. But the sorry truth is the guarding of votes only means we are being made pawns of a determined onslaught by oligarchies who do not want change and yet want us to believe that they are campaigning for change.

According to ABS-CBN “we have one year to change traditional politics in our country and we are empowering them through this multimedia campaign.” Only one year? We have been at it for generations.

It will of course be condemned if media were to proclaim their candidate and that this advocacy is part of the grand scheme to get Noynoy elected as President because he will protect vested interests.

The Lopez owned media boasts of its multiplatform structure — television, radio, cable TV, the Internet, and mobile technology. I can bet you it would never be used if it were in support of a strong state capable of regulating the power of monopolies. But for a long time now, it has been clear that the marriage of powerful media and political partisanship is a lethal combination. It has not helped the country move forward. It isn’t about change but about protecting the status quo. Posted by Dodong aka Ka Kiko at 6:02 AM 0 comments

Saturday, October 24, 2009

Islamic State in Mindanao?

Gratitude and ignorance CTALK
By Cito Beltran
(The Philippine Star)
Updated October 23, 2009 12:00 AM

(W)hen the IED (improvised explosive device) bombing happened, the Americans got blamed for getting killed while on the way to help construct a school building.

Because of our island mentality our politicians were not aware that in the same month there was a simultaneous number of IED related attacks globally. That one incident that killed 2 US soldiers and a Filipino Marine was just a tiny bead in a global string of attacks that happened in the same period.

The terrorists in Mindanao have a clear agenda that the Nationalists in Metro Manila take for granted because it’s not happening in their backyard. The terrorists are not waging a war against US troops or our AFP per se. The battle is between education and ignorance.

The terrorists don’t want Filipino education, they want Islamic education. Because of this, the battle between education and ignorance is actually a “religious war”. This is the simple reason why the terrorists target teachers, principals, priests, pastors and missionary workers.

About seven years ago, I received a tip that a Muslim youth group in UP Diliman had been infiltrated by a terrorist. That small tip yielded information that a Middle Eastern individual had built up a foundation and a network of contacts that would build up “Islamic schools” all over Mindanao.

The school however turned out to be a recruitment machinery for impoverished young men who were led to convert from Catholics to Muslims which according to the claims of the “Middle Eastern operative” reached as much as one million converts over the years.

The “plan” was to build up an “Islamic population” so the Philippines could not prevent the ultimate creation of an “Islamic state” that would complete the chain in the region.

That operative eventually graduated from recruitment to direct terrorist activities or funding such operations. He was tracked down in another continent where government troopers literally flattened the house with high caliber automatic gunfire.

That however will not stop the terrorists from kidnapping priests, it will not stop them from abducting women and children, nor will it stop them from taking people who are trying to help people regardless of race, religion, or sex.

The only thing that will stop terrorists is a determined force with a just cause. Right now, the only people who have consistently stopped that determined force and subverted that just cause are politicians and Metro Manila Nationalists with good intentions with an address in hell.

Unfortunately, the kidnappers, the terrorists, the victims, the soldiers of the AFP and even the US troops have lived, fought, bled, and have died in Mindanao.

Meanwhile the critics, the politicians and the so-called nationalists all live in comfort here in Metro Manila. Posted by Dodong aka Ka Kiko at 1:53 AM 0 comments

Tuesday, September 15, 2009

Yellow Revolution in 2010?

Pieces of a puzzle…
FROM A DISTANCE
By Carmen N. Pedrosa
The Philippine Star)
Updated September 12, 2009 12:00 AM

A civic leader narrated in a recent conference how it was suggested to him by an ABS-CBN anchor to paint the entire country yellow. That is a loud hint of what this chain of events is all about — a color revolution not unlike those launched in countries where the US wants to pursue a policy direction. Color revolutions have been successful in other countries like Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgystan. The pattern of color revolutions is to incite massive street protests after disputed elections. In the Philippines, the “Garci tape” and the resignation of the Hyatt 10 failed to bring the people into the streets. A massing in the streets (for whatever purpose) was finally achieved in Cory’s funeral cortege that is why operatives quickly moved to use the event for a political cause — the anointing of Noynoy as presidential candidate.

Noynoy had the decency to wait for 40 days after his mother’s death before announcing his candidacy, but intense maneuvering for the yellow revolution was already set in motion.

The yellow revolution and the anointing of Noynoy as the presidential candidate of the Liberal Party are endgames of a determined effort to overthrow President Arroyo that began in 2004. So what are color revolutions? Various reports point to the George Soros Foundation that works with elements of the US government to plan and initiate these “spontaneous” events.

It was published in The Guardian that USAID, National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, and Freedom House have also been directly involved. Both the Washington Post and New York Times also reported on how color revolutions were used for the West’s political agenda. (You can get a listing of donations to the Philippines from the Soros in the Internet. Donations were given to unnamed individuals for “education”.)

Consequently, more countries shy away from color revolutions and avoid any color or flower to describe homegrown grassroots campaigns. In other words, they reject color revolutions because these connote foreign interference and shallow reforms.

The Friedrich Naumann Foundation has partnered with the Liberal Party of the Philippines in pushing a “democratic and liberal” agenda in the Philippines.

The same foundation was accused of being behind anti-China protests over Tibet during the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The campaign was planned in its Washington-based headquarters. Posted by Dodong aka Ka Kiko at 3:04 AM 0 comments

Saturday, September 12, 2009

The sad truth

Pieces of a puzzle…
FROM A DISTANCE
By Carmen N. Pedrosa
(The Philippine Star)
Updated September 12, 2009 12:00 AM

A lot of friends have said to me they were confused by the rapid chain of events that culminated in the ascendancy of Noynoy Aquino as a leading presidential candidate. How a lackluster senator should suddenly be catapulted to become first in line is being justified because “he is the son of good parents like Ninoy and Cory Aquino”. It may be true that there was a big crowd at Cory’s funeral cortege although it was smaller than the more spontaneous crowds that joined Ninoy’s in 1983. To our dismay we learned that massing crowds has only a short shelf life. Cory’s EDSA revolutions very soon disappointed because these were mere “changing” of the guards. This column would therefore caution confused Filipinos. The crowds may be lauded for paying their respects to a democracy icon but that does not invest them with the right to speak for 80 million Filipinos and their fate in the coming years. We should stand against using Cory’s death to wrest political power even if her son is the vehicle. It would be a step back for our political maturity. The question should be weighed against issues and events outside the Philippines. The well-attended funeral of former President Cory Aquino should be considered in a more modest context.

For years, she had led attempts to call on people to join her in ousting President GMA but there were no takers. The most memorable of these failed attempts was on television for all to see when she wanted to bring in “followers” into the camp to pray.

The military, thankfully, were wiser and asked her to pray outside the camps. The country faced a greater peril if a battle should break out between two camps of soldiers armed to kill each other. Happily, cooler heads prevailed (not from Cory’s peaceful camp) – lives were spared, the republic kept intact and the nation saved from breaking apart.

With that memorable confrontation in mind in which Cory played an unfortunate role I think no one was more surprised than her own family of the sea change that took place because from then on all attempts to bring down the Arroyo government through mobs were resisted by the general public. Posted by Dodong aka Ka Kiko at 1:13 AM 0 comments

G.R. No. 174198

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

 

 

 

 

 

SECOND DIVISION

 

 

 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - ZAIDA KAMAD y AMBING,  Accused-Appellant.	G.R. No. 174198 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, CORONA,* BRION, ABAD, and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: January 19, 2010
x——————————————————————————————————- x
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:

We review the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 which affirmed in toto the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 259, Parañaque City[4] in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1236-7 finding Zaida[5] Kamad y Ambing (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Along with her boyfriend Leo Ramirez y Acosta (Leo) who was charged for illegal possession of shabu, the accused-appellant was charged under an Information[6] that reads:

The above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give away, distribute and sell to a customer for P300.00 pesos one (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing crystalline substance (shabu) weighing 0.20 gram, which when examined were found positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

 

 CONTRARY TO LAW.  

The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The prosecution’s version of events is summarized below.

On October 16, 2002, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Drug Enforcement Unit of the Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig (Taguig police) received information from an asset that a certain “Zaida” was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu at Purok IV, Silverio Compound in Parañaque City. The Taguig police formed a buy-bust team composed of P/Insp. Antonio Parillas,[7] PO3 Christopher Maulit[8] (PO3 Maulit), PO1 Manfoste,[9] SPO2 Arthur Velasco, and SPO2 Ernesto Sanchez[10] (SPO2 Sanchez), as members. SPO2 Sanchez acted as poseur-buyer and received three (3) one hundred peso bills for use as marked money.

After surveillance of the area, the buy-bust team and their asset proceeded at around 10:00 p.m. of October 16, 2002 to the target area where they immediately saw the accused-appellant and Leo. The asset and SPO2 Sanchez approached the two while the rest of the buy-bust team watched from a distance. The asset introduced SPO2 Sanchez as a buyer of shabu and the accused-appellant asked him how much he would buy. SPO2 Sanchez asked for P300.00 worth of shabu and gave the marked money; the accused-appellant thereafter handed him a plastic sachet containing a substance suspected to be shabu. SPO2 Sanchez lighted a cigarette to give the pre-arranged signal for the buy-bust team to approach. SPO2 Sanchez arrested the accused-appellant and recovered from her the P300.00 marked money. The buy-bust team arrested Leo who was found in possession of one (1) plastic sachet also suspected to contain shabu.

The buy-bust team took the accused-appellant and Leo and the recovered plastic sachets to their office for investigation. The recovered plastic sachets, marked as “ES-1-161009” and “ES-2-161002,” were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination; the tests yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[11]

The defense expectedly presented a different version of events.

The accused-appellant[12] denied the charge and claimed that she and Leo were framed-up. At around 2:30 p.m. of October 16, 2002, the accused-appellant and Leo went to Leo’s cousin’s house. Since Leo’s cousin was not yet at home, she and Leo waited. After waiting for an hour, four (4) men wearing civilian clothes and carrying firearms entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers. The accused-appellant and Leo were frisked, but nothing was found in their possession. The police officers asked the accused-appellant where she kept the shabu; she replied that she was not selling shabu. Afterwards, she and Leo were taken to the police headquarters where they were again frisked and asked the same question to which they gave the same response. The police detained Leo and the accused-appellant for about a day and later brought them to the Prosecutor’s Office for inquest without showing them any shabu.

 

The RTC Ruling

 

After consideration of the evidence, the RTC decreed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding both accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby sentences Zaida Kamad to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 for Violation of Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165 …

 

x x x x

 

SO ORDERED.[13]

 

 

The accused-appellant appealed the RTC decision to the CA, attacking the RTC’s reliance on the presumption of regularity that the RTC found to have attended the conduct of the buy-bust operation by the police. She argued that no presumption of regularity could arise considering that the police violated NAPOLCOM rules by using an asset; the rules prohibit the deputation of private persons as PNP civilian agents.[14] The accused-appellant also pointed out the material inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that cast doubt on their credibility, namely: (a) the uncertainty of SPO2 Sanchez regarding the time the buy-bust team was dispatched to the target area; (b) the confusion of PO3 Maulit on the identity of the team leader of the buy-bust team; (c) the admitted mistake of PO3 Maulit that only the recovered plastic sachet was marked “ES” (standing for the initials of SPO2 Sanchez), while the marked money was marked “MF” (standing for the initials of P/Insp. Mariano F. Fegarido as commanding officer); and (d) the contradictory statements of PO3 Maulit who testified that it was Leo who sold the shabu and that of SPO2 Sanchez who testified that it was the accused-appellant who sold him the shabu.

 

The CA Ruling

 

The CA rejected the defense arguments and affirmed in toto the RTC findings. The CA ruled that the prosecution satisfactorily established the accused-appellant’s guilt based on the positive testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on the conduct of the buy-bust operation; his testimony bore badges of truth. Accordingly, the CA found the accused-appellant’s uncorroborated denial undeserving of any weight. The CA brushed aside as a minor inconsistency the uncertainty in the testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on the time the buy-bust operation took place. The CA also brushed aside the violation of the NAPOLCOM rules on the ground that the accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto for illegal sale of shabu committed in the presence of the prosecution witnesses who were police officers. Moreover, the CA held that the use of assets to aid police officers in buy-bust operations has been judicially recognized. The CA found that while the asset brokered the shabu transaction, he had no role in the apprehension of the accused-appellant and in the search and seizure of the shabu from the accused-appellant.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for
the illegal sale of 0.20 gram of shabu.

The Court’s Ruling

We draw attention at the outset to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case; the appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.[15] We find the present appeal meritorious on the basis of such review.

As a general rule, the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. This rule, however, admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.[16] After due consideration of the records of this case, the evidence adduced, and the applicable law and jurisprudence, we hold that a deviation from the general rule is warranted.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.[17] Proof of the corpus delicti in a buy-bust situation requires evidence, not only that the transacted drugs actually exist, but evidence as well that the drugs seized and examined are the same drugs presented in court. This is a condition sine qua non for conviction as the drugs are the main subject of the illegal sale constituting the crime and their existence and identification must be proven for the crime to exist. As we discuss below, the special characteristics of prohibited drugs necessitate their strict identification by the prosecution.[18]

Our examination of the records shows that while the prosecution established through the testimony of SPO2 Sanchez that the sale of the prohibited drug by the accused-appellant took place, we find that both the RTC and the CA failed to consider the following infirmities in the prosecution’s case: (1) the serious lapses in the RA 9165 procedure committed by the buy-bust team in handling the seized shabu; and (2) the failure of the police to comply with the chain of custody rule in handling the seized shabu, resulting in the prosecution’s failure to properly identify the shabu offered in court as the same shabu seized from the accused-appellant on October 16, 2002.

Non-compliance with the prescribed procedure

under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165

 

 

In People v. Garcia,[19] we emphasized the prosecution’s duty to adduce evidence proving compliance by the buy-bust team with the prescribed procedure laid down under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. This provision reads:

• 1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. [emphasis supplied]

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 under its Section 21(a) provides further details on how RA 9165 is to be applied, and provides too for a saving mechanism in case no strict compliance with the requirements took place. Section 21(a) states:

(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.[Emphasis supplied.]

Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drug’s unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.[20] Hence, the rules on the measures to be observed during and after the seizure, during the custody and transfer of the drugs for examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court.

In this case, SPO2 Sanchez testified on the seizure and the handling of the seized shabu. The records show that his testimony and the identification he made in court constitute the totality of the prosecution’s evidence on how the police handled and preserved the integrity of the seized shabu. Significantly, SPO2 Sanchez merely stated in his testimony that:

Q: What else transpired when Zaida gave something to you and you, being the poseur buyer, gave the money to Zaida?

 

A: We brought them to our office.

 

x x x x

 

Q: What did you do with those plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance?

 

A: We brought them to the SPD Crime Lab for examination.[21]

Thus, he failed to provide specific details on how the seized shabu was marked although the evidence shows that the shabu was marked as “ES-1-161009” before it was sent to a forensic laboratory. His testimony also failed to state whether the marking of the shabu was done immediately after its seizure (as Section 21 of RA 9165 requires) or during the investigation. His testimony likewise failed to disclose if a physical inventory and photography of the seized items had taken place, or if they had, whether these were undertaken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, or a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and of an elective official.

In sum, his testimony failed to show how the integrity and evidentiary value of the item seized had been preserved; no explanation was ever given by SPO2 Sanchez to justify the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with the prescribed procedures. In fact, the records clearly reveal that the prosecution did not even acknowledge the procedural lapses committed by the buy-bust team in the handling of the seized shabu.

The consequences of the above omissions must necessarily be grave for the prosecution under the rule that penal laws, such as RA 9165, are strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.[22] One consequence is to produce doubts on the origins of the illegal drug presented in court,[23] thus leading to the prosecution’s failure to establish the corpus delicti.[24] Unless excused by the saving mechanism, the acquittal of the accused must follow.

The non-compliance with the

chain of custody rule

 

Separately from Section 21 violations, we also find the prosecution fatally remiss in establishing an unbroken link in the chain of custody of the seized shabu; its evidence is simply incomplete in establishing the necessary links in the handling of the seized prohibited drug from the time of its seizure until its presentation in court.

In Mallillin v. People,[25] we explained the chain of custody rule and what constitutes sufficient compliance with this rule:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witnesses’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. [emphasis supplied][26]

We applied this ruling in People v. Garcia,[27] People v. Gum-Oyen,[28] People v. Denoman[29] and People v. Coreche[30] where we recognized the following links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

 

• (a) The first link in the chain of custody

  

We observe that SPO2 Sanchez’ testimony lacks specifics on how the seized shabu was handled immediately after the accused-appellant’s arrest. Although the records show that SPO2 Sanchez testified that he actually seized the shabu when he arrested the accused-appellant, he never disclosed the identity of the person/s who had custody and possession of the shabu after its seizure, nor that he retained possession of the shabu from the place of the arrest until they reached the police station.

SPO2 Sanchez also failed to state the time and place as well as the identity of the person/s who made the markings on the two (2) plastic sachets containing the recovered shabu seized from the accused-appellant and Leo on October 16, 2002.

• (b) The second link in the chain of custody

 

We also observe that SPO2 Sanchez’ testimony regarding the post-arrest police investigation failed to provide particulars on whether the shabu was turned over to the investigator. The records only identify the name of the investigator as one SPO1 Nuestro before whom SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated October 17, 2002.[31] Thus, a big gap exists on who had custody and possession of the shabu prior to, during and immediately after the police investigation, and how the shabu was stored, preserved, labeled and recorded from the time of its seizure up to its receipt by the forensic laboratory.

 

• (c) The third link in the chain of custody

 

The third link in the chain is represented by two (2) pieces of documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution consisting of the letter-request dated October 17, 2002[32] of Police Superintendent Mariano F. Fegarido as Chief of the Southern Police District Drug Enforcement Group and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02 prepared by Engr. Richard Allan B. Mangalip as the forensic chemist.[33]

These documents reveal that the recovered plastic sachets of shabu bearing the markings “ES-1-161002” and “ES-2-161002” were sent to the forensic laboratory sealed in one (1) small brown envelope bearing unidentified signatures. On the same day, the PNP Crime Laboratory received this letter-request along with the submitted specimens. The specimens were then subjected to qualitative examination which yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.

These pieces of evidence notably fail to identify the person who personally brought the seized shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory. They also fail to clearly identify the person who received the shabu at the forensic laboratory pursuant to the letter-request dated October 17, 2002, and who exercised custody and possession of the shabu after it was examined and before it was presented in court. Neither was there any evidence adduced showing how the seized shabu was handled, stored and safeguarded pending its presentation in court.

• (d) The fourth link in the chain of custody

 

The fourth link presents a very strange and unusual twist in the prosecution’s evidence in this case. Although the forensic chemist was presented in court, we find that his offered testimony related to a shabu specimen other than that seized in the buy-bust operation of October 16, 2002. Specifically, his testimony pertained to shabu seized by the police on October 12, 2002. This is borne by the following exchanges:

FISCAL UY: The testimony of the witness is being offered to prove . . . that he is the one who cause [sic] the examination of the physical evidence subject of this case containing with white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet weighing 0.20 grams and 0.30 grams with markings of EBC and EBC-1 that I reduced findings after the examination conducted.

 

x x x x

 

Q And with the cause of the performance of your duties, were you able to receive a letter request relevant to this case specifically a drug test request, dated October 12, 2002 from PS/Insp. Wilfredo Calderon. Do you have the letter request with you?

 

A Yes, sir.

 

Q The witness presented to this representation the letter request dated October 12, 2002 for purposes of identification, respectfully request that it be marked in evidence as Exhibit A. In this Exhibit A Mr. Officer, were you able to receive the evidence submitted specifically a small brown stapled wire envelope with signature containing with white crystalline substance inside and with markings EBC- 12/10/02 and EBC-1 12/10/02. After you received this specimen what action did you take or do?

 

A Upon receiving, I read and understand the content of the letter request after which, I stamped and marked the letter request and then record it on the logbook and after recording it on the logbook, I performed the test for determination of the presence of dangerous drug on the specimen.

 

x x x x

 

Q Now, after those tests conducted what was the result of the examination?

 

A It gives positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.

 

x x x x

 

Q At this juncture your Honor, the witness handed with this representation a brown envelope with markings D-1487-02, and the signature and the date 12 October 02, now Mr. Witness tell us who placed these markings on this brown envelope?

 

A I am the one who personally made the markings, sir.

 

Q And in the face of this brown envelope there is a printed name PO1 Edwin Plopinio and the signature and the date 12 October 2002. Do you know who placed who placed those markings?

 

A I have no idea.

 

Q At this juncture your Honor, this representation proceeded to open the brown envelope. May I respectfully request that this brown envelope be marked in evidence as Exhibit B. And inside this brown envelope are three pieces of plastic sachets inside which are white crystalline substance with markings EPC 12 October 02 and EPC-1 12 October 02. May I respectfully request that these plastic sachets with white substance inside be marked in evidence as Exhibit B-1 and B-2. And in these plastic sachets with white crystalline inside is a masking tape with the signature and letters are RAM, do you know who placed those letters?

 

A I am the one who placed that markings sir.

 

Q And what RAM stands for?

 

A That stands for my name Richard Allan Mangalip sir.

 

Q You mentioned that you reduced your findings in writing, do you have the official finding with you?

 

A Yes, sir.

 

Q At this juncture the witness handed to this representation the physical science report no. D-1487-2 for purposes of identification respectfully request that this specimen be marked in evidence as Exhibit C. And in this Exhibit C, there is a signature above the typewritten name Engineer Richard Allan B. Mangalip, do you whose signature is this Mr. Witness? [34] [Emphasis supplied]

 

A That is my signature sir.

 

Q Respectfully request that the signature appearing in Exhibit C be marked in evidence as Exhibit C-1. You stated earlier that you cause the weight of the white crystalline substance in this plastic sachet, what the weights of this white crystalline substance?

 

A For the specimen A, it is .20 grams and the specimen B, it is .30 gram.

 

Q May I respectfully request that this weight indicated in this physical science report now mark in evidence as Exhibit C-2. I have no further questions to the witness your Honor.

 

x x x x

Aside from the different dates of seizure, we note that the shabu identified and presented in court as evidence through the testimony of the forensic chemist, showed characteristics distinct from the shabu from the buy-bust sale of October 16, 2002:

First, there were different markings made on the plastic sachets of the shabu recovered on October 12, 2002. As testified to, one plastic sachet of shabu was marked, “EBC 12 October 02,” while the other plastic sachet of shabu was marked, “EBC-1 12 October 02”;[35]

Second, there was a different sealed brown envelope used where a printed name and signature of one “PO1 Edwin Plopino” and the date “12 October 2002” were written; [36]

Third, the examination of the shabu by the PNP Crime Laboratory was made pursuant to a different letter-request for examination dated October 12, 2002 written by one P/Insp. Wilfredo Calderon;[37] and

Fourth, the results of the shabu testified to by the forensic chemist in court was contained in a different forensic laboratory report known as Physical Science Report No. D-1487-2.[38]

We highlight these characteristics because they are different from the documentary evidence the prosecution formally offered[39] consisting of the letter-request dated October 17, 2002[40] and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02.[41] The testimonies of SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit as well as the submitted documentary evidence referred to the plastic sachets of shabu through their markings of “ES-1-161002” and “ES-2-161002.”[42]

From all these, we find it obvious that some mistake must have been made in the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence. The prosecution, however, left the discrepancies fully unexplained. To reiterate, the forensic chemist testified to a specimen dated October 12, 2002, or one secured way before the buy-bust of October 16, 2002, but marked as evidence documents relating to the specimen of October 16, 2002. Strangely, even the defense disregarded the discrepancies. In his comment on the offer of evidence, the defense simply stated, among others, by way of stipulation, that “the forensic chemical officer only conducted a qualitative examination of the specimen he examined and not the quantitative examination.”[43] Coming immediately after the offer of evidence that mentioned the plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances with markings “ES-1 16/10/02” and “ES-2 16/10/02,” and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02,[44] the defense was clearly sleeping on its feet when it reacted to the prosecution’s offer of evidence.

But the defense was not alone in glossing over the discrepancies between the testimony for the prosecution and the offered evidence, as both the RTC and CA also failed to notice the glaring flaws in the prosecution’s evidence. Apparently, because the parties did not point out these discrepancies while the appellate court did not closely review the records of the proceedings, the discrepancies were not taken into account in the decision now under review.

These observations bring us full circle to our opening statement under the Court’s ruling on the kind and extent of review that an appellate court undertakes in a criminal case; the appeal opens the whole case for review, with the appellate court charged with the duty to cite and appreciate the errors it may find in the appealed judgment, whether these errors are assigned or unassigned. This is one such instance where we are duty bound to rectify errors that, although unnoticed below and unassigned by the parties, are clearly reflected in the records of the case.

The Conclusion

 

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise.[45] In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the seized and examined shabu and that formally offered in court cannot but lead to serious doubts regarding the origins of the shabu presented in court. This discrepancy and the gap in the chain of custody immediately affect proof of the corpus delicti without which the accused must be acquitted.

From the constitutional law point of view, the prosecution’s failure to establish with moral certainty all the elements of the crime and to identify the accused as the perpetrator signify that it failed to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence that every accused enjoys in a criminal prosecution. When this happens, as in this case, the courts need not even consider the case for the defense in deciding the case; a ruling for acquittal must forthwith issue.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the March 28, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 affirming the decision of conviction dated October 27, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259, Parañaque City in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1236-7 for illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Accused-appellant ZAIDA KAMAD y AMBING is hereby declared ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless she is confined for any other lawful cause.

 

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

ARTURO D. BRION

 Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice	ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

JOSE P. PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

 

 

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO 

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

 

 

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

* Designated additional Member of the Second Division vice Justice del Castillo who recused himself from the case due to his prior action in the Court of Appeals, per Division Raffle dated December 14, 2009.

[1] Dated March 28, 2006; rollo, pp. 2-11.

[2] Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, and concurred in by Presiding Justice Conrado Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (now a Member of this Court).

[3] Dated October 27, 2004; CA rollo, pp. 13-19.

[4] Penned by Judge Zosimo V. Escano.

[5] Also referred to as “Zenaida” in the records.

[6] Records, p. 1.

[7] Also referred to as “Pasillao” in the records.

[8] TSN, March 27, 2003, pp. 3-17.

[9] Also referred to as “PO1 Mengote” in the records.

[10] TSN, February 4, 2003, pp. 3-25.

[11] Records, p. 5.

[12] TSN, February 19, 2004, pp. 4-37.

[13] CA rollo, p. 19.

[14] Memorandum Circular 93-009 issued on June 29, 1993.

[15] People v. Balagat, G.R. No. 177163, April 24, 2009.

[16] People v. Robles, G.R. No. 177220, April 24, 2009.

[17] Id.

[18] Mallillin v. People, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 633.

[19] G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009.

[20] People v. Robles; supra note 16.

[21] TSN, February 4, 2003, pp. 14-15.

[22] People v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 177222, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 273, 285.

[23] People v. Garcia; supra note 19; People v. De la Cruz; supra note 22, at 286; People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 181545, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 273, 284; People v. Santos, Jr., G.R. No. 175593, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 489, 504; People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 174771, September 11, 2007, 532 SCRA 630, 641; and People v. Orteza, G.R. No. 173051, July 31, 2007, 528 SCRA 750, 758-759.

[24] People v. Orteza, et al; supra note 23, at 758-759.

[25] Supra note 18, at 632-633.

[26] Id.

[27] Supra note 19.

[28] G.R. No. 182231, April 16, 2009.

[29] G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2009.

[30] G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009.

[31] Records, pp. 3-4.

[32] Id. at 6.

[33] Id. at 5.

[34] TSN, December 16, 2002, pp. 3-8.

[35] Id. at 7.

[36] Id. at 6-7.

[37] Id. at 4.

[38] Id. at 8; Records, p. 5.

[39] TSN, December 16, 2002, p. 13, but the TSN apparently made a mistake in identifying the offeror as Atty. Balayan, counsel for Leo Ramirez, instead of the prosecution whose turn it was to make the offer after the defense finished with their cross-examination of Witness Mangalip.

[40] Supra note 30.

[41] Supra note 31.

[42] TSN, February 4, 2003, p. 19; TSN, March 27, 2003, p. 48; supra note 30 and note 31.

[43] TSN, December 16, 2002, p. 14.

[44] Id. at 13.

[45] People v. Obmiranis, G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 140, 156.

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled, among others, that:

1.  A Respondent is not accorded and therefore can not claim the right to Preliminary Investigation in cases not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court;

2.  An interpretation of the "finding of probable cause";

3.  The Supreme Court can determine probable cause without intruding into the domain of the Prosecutors;

4.  That an Information filed without any evidence to sustain "probable cause" can not be a valid source of a Warrant of Arrest.  Any Warrant of Arrest issued on the basis of that Information is not valid.

The factual setting of the case is before the amendment of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as to the "cases that are subject to Preliminary Investigation" and "those who can conduct Preliminary Investigation".  The Rules cited in the instant case is that Old Rule when only cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court are subject to Preliminary Investigation and that Judges of the first level courts can still conduct Preliminary Investigation.  Now,  even cases under the Original Jurisdiction of the first level as long as the penalty is more than four (4) years are subject to Preliminary Investigation.  Also,  judges of the first level courts are no longer authorized to conduct Preliminary Investigation.

This case stemmed from an Information filed by a Government Prosecutor.  The Supreme Court said:

"

In a Resolution^[1][12] dated September 23, 1998, the City Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their Pre-Trial Brief.^[2][13] Subsequently, the corresponding Informations^[3][14] were filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants^[4][15] for the arrest of the petitioners.

[1][12] The dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, In view of all the foregoing, undersigned finds probable cause that the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents in evidence under par. 2, Article 172, RPC (4 counts) had been committed and that respondents Teodoro Borlongan, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa, and Arturo Manuel are probably guilty.

Let Informations be filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City of Bago, Philippines.

SO RESOLVED. (Id. at 110-114).

[2][13] Rollo, pp. 113-114.

[3][14] Id. at 115-122.

[4][15] Id. at 123-126.

Respondents move to quash the four (4) Information filed on the ground, among others, that "they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. They then argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal case should have been suspended on the ground that the issue being threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial question."

"In an Order^[1][17] dated November 13, 1998, the court denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case — which fell within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, the court added, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue involved in the civil case was not a prejudicial question, and thus, denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal proceedings. Lastly, the court was convinced that the Informations contained all the facts necessary to constitute an offense.

Petitioners subsequently instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and TRO, before the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing and not recalling the warrants of arrest, reiterating the arguments in their omnibus motion.^[2][18] They, likewise, questioned the court’s conclusion that by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to assail the validity of the warrant of arrest.

On June 20, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition.^[3][19] Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners now raise before us the following issues:

A.

Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause required for the filing of an Information in court?

If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause, should not the investigating prosecutor dismiss the complaint, or at the very least, require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit?

B.

Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the personal knowledge of the complainant be sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause?

C.

Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, and the record of the preliminary investigation does not show the existence of probable cause, should not the judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and dismiss the criminal case, or at the very least, require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit in order to aid the judge in determining the existence of probable cause?

D.

Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?

E.

Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable cause?^[4][20]"

[1][17] The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For reinvestigation is hereby denied.

Set arraignment of the accused on December 1, 1998 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED. (Id. at 143-150).

[2][18] Rollo, pp. 151-186.

[3][19] Supra note 1.

[4][20] Rollo, pp. 13-14.

On the issue, whether or not the Respondent is denied due process of law when he was not able to submit his Counter Affidavit because there was no Preliminary Investigation the Supreme Court ruled:

"As will be discussed below, the petitioners could not validly claim the right to preliminary investigation."

x x x x x x x

Petitioners were charged with the offense defined and penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172^[1][35] of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty imposable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Clearly, the case is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and preliminary investigation is not mandatory.^[2][36]

[1][35] Article 172.

x x x x

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.

x x x x x x x x x

In light of the foregoing, it appears that the proper procedure was followed by the prosecutor in determining probable cause for the filing of the informations, and by the trial court judge in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest. To reiterate, preliminary investigation was not mandatory, and the submission of counter-affidavit was not necessary.

[2][36] Villanueva v. Judge Almazan, 384 Phil. 776, 784 (2000); Del Rosario, Jr. v. Judge Bartolome, 337 Phil. 330, 333 (1997).

The Honorable Supreme Court rationalized that "only in cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court" can there be a right to "Preliminary Investigation".  (in the new Rule now, even cases cognizable by the first level courts, provided that the penalty is more than four (4) years, Preliminary Investigation is required, emphasis by LEGALHAWK)

Conversely, with that pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it can be said that the refusal to conduct Preliminary Investigation when validly invoked by a Respondent (like when he seasonably filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation within five (5) days from the filing of an Information as a result of an INQUEST and the court denies such MOTION) IS A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS (Rolito Go Case).

As to the definition (Rule of Thumb) of the "finding of Probable Cause" by the Prosecutor and the "finding of Probable Cause for the purpose of issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, Court ruled:

"True, a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be more than mere suspicion.^[1][51] While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.^[2][52] It is, therefore, imperative for the prosecutor to relieve the accused from the pain and inconvenience of going through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused."^[3][53]

^{x x x x x x x x x x x x x}

Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.^[1][38] It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted.^[2][39] A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.^[3][40]

On the other hand, we have defined probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.^[4][41]

To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause. Otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor’s findings in such investigations.^[5][42] In the same way, the general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.^[6][43] It is only in exceptional cases when this Court may set aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice.^[7][44] The facts obtaining in the present case warrant the application of the exception.

This case opens the eyes of the Prosecutor not to hide under the job of "finding probable cause" and let the Judge decide.  When, in the finding of the Prosecutor,  there is want evidence, the Supreme Court grants him that mantle of authority to dismiss the case. The Honorable Supreme Court gives the reason for this: "

"to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.^[1][52] It is, therefore, imperative for the prosecutor to relieve the accused from the pain and inconvenience of going through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused."^[2][53]

[1][52] Ching v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 164317, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 609, 629-630; Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163593, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 387, 410.

[2][53] R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 369, 395.

[1][38] Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 154239-41, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 533, 550.

[2][39] Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, June 1, 2007.

[3][40] Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 38.

[4][41] Id; Cuevas v. Muñoz, 401 Phil. 752, 773 (2000); Ho v. People, supra note 37, at 608.

[5][42] Ladlad v. Velasco, supra note 39.

[6][43] De Joya v. Marquez, G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 376, 381.

[7][44] Id.; Ladlad v. Velasco, supra note 39.

[1][51] See AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007; and Hon. Drilon v. CA, 327 Phil. 916, 922 (1996), where the Court found that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor in finding probable as the evidence, taken altogether constitute probable cause.

[2][52] Ching v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 164317, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 609, 629-630; Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163593, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 387, 410.

[3][53] R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 369, 395.

1) For an accused to be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, “the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610.” (citing Amployo v. People,  G.R. No. 157718, April 26, 2005, 457 SCRA 282, 291).

The foregoing is among the doctrines enunciated by the Supreme Court, through its Second Division, in the case of Cabila v, People, promulgated November 23, 2007.

2) In general, a trust receipt transaction imposes upon the entrustee the obligation to deliver to the entruster the price of the sale, or if the merchandise is not sold, to return the same to the entruster. There are thus two obligations in a trust receipt transaction: the first, refers to money received under the obligation involving the duty to turn it over (entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise sold [People v. Cuevo, 191 Phil. 622, 630 (1981)], while the second refers to merchandise received under the obligation to “return” it (devolvera) to the owner (ibid). A violation of any of these undertakings constitutes estafa defined under Art. 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as provided by Sec. 13 of Presidential Decree 115  [Gonzalez vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 164904, October 19, 2007]

3) Section 4 (Amendment of complaint or information) and Section 5 (Effect of sustaining the motion to quash) of Rule 117 were tackled by the Supreme Court in Gonzales vs. Salvador, et al., G.R. No. 168340, December 5, 2006

Provincial Prosecutor Danny c. Bumacod presiding over the meeting.

Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Zenny Ferrer discusses a point during the meeting.  Provincial Prosecutor Danny C. Bumacod and the other Assistant Prosecutors listen.

Senior Prosecutor Barney Tade starts the meeting by announcing the agenda to be discussed.

Prosecutors & Staff   listen intently on points that are being discussed.

Fiscal Irene and Fiscal Merly on the foreground.

Staff of the Office led by Elvie, Caloy, Viron & Buena

Chato & Viron occupy a table to listen to the discussion

Other Staff of the Offices

Prosecutors pose for posterity.  From left to right:

Prosecutor Manny Dulnuan, Prosecutor Valdez, Prosecutor Bong Navalta, Prosecutor Irene Cortez, Prosecutor Merly Espinosa, Prosecutor Pablo Lachica, Provincial Prosecutor Danny Bumacod, Prosecutor Barney Tade, Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Zenny Ferrer, Prosecutor Bong Solomon, Prosecutor Imelda Cosalan, Prosecutor Ruth Bernabe, Prosecutor Manny Oliva, and Prosecutor Bonnie Mangibin.

The next meeting will be during the Christmas Party to be held on December 21, 2007 at San Fernando City, La Union.

Judge booted for flipping coin to decide

By LARRY O’DELL, Associated Press Writer Fri Nov 2, 5:02 PM ET

RICHMOND, Va. – A judge who ordered a woman to drop her pants and decided a custody dispute by flipping a coin was removed from the bench by the Virginia Supreme Court on Friday. The decision against Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Judge James Michael Shull of Gate City was unanimous.

“Unless our citizens can trust that judges will fairly resolve the disputes brought before our courts, and treat all litigants with dignity, our courts will lose the public’s respect and confidence upon which our legal system depends,” Justice Barbara Milano Keenan wrote.

According to the court, Shull admitted tossing a coin to determine which parent would have visitation with a child on Christmas. Shull said he was trying to encourage the parents to decide the issue themselves but later acknowledged that he was wrong.

The pants-dropping incidents, the court said, “were even more egregious.”

The court said they occurred when a woman was seeking a protective order against a partner who she said had stabbed her in the leg. Shull knew the woman had a history of mental problems and insisted on seeing the wound, the court said.

The woman dropped her pants once to display the wound, then dropped them a second time after Shull left the bench for a closer look to determine whether the woman had received stitches.

A court bailiff testified before the commission that after the hearing, he asked Shull, “Did you see what that lady had on?” According to the bailiff, Shull replied: “Yeah, a black lacy thing … it looked good, didn’t it?”

Shull denied making the comment. His attorney, Russell V. Palmore, did not immediately return a phone call seeking comment Friday.

The justices could have merely censured Shull, but they noted that he had appeared before the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission in 2004 for allegedly calling a teenager a “mama’s boy” and a “wuss” and advising a woman to marry her abusive boyfriend. That complaint was dismissed with an admonition to Shull to chalk it up as a learning experience.