The Supreme Court handed down a monumental decision on November 27,2007 about the conduct of Preliminary Investigation. The case in point is Borlongan, et al. versus Peña, et al. (G.R. No. 143591)
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled, among others, that:
1. A Respondent is not accorded and therefore can not claim the right to Preliminary Investigation in cases not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court;
2. An interpretation of the "finding of probable cause";
3. The Supreme Court can determine probable cause without intruding into the domain of the Prosecutors;
4. That an Information filed without any evidence to sustain "probable cause" can not be a valid source of a Warrant of Arrest. Any Warrant of Arrest issued on the basis of that Information is not valid.
The factual setting of the case is before the amendment of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as to the "cases that are subject to Preliminary Investigation" and "those who can conduct Preliminary Investigation". The Rules cited in the instant case is that Old Rule when only cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court are subject to Preliminary Investigation and that Judges of the first level courts can still conduct Preliminary Investigation. Now, even cases under the Original Jurisdiction of the first level as long as the penalty is more than four (4) years are subject to Preliminary Investigation. Also, judges of the first level courts are no longer authorized to conduct Preliminary Investigation.
This case stemmed from an Information filed by a Government Prosecutor. The Supreme Court said:
"
In a Resolution[1][12] dated September 23, 1998, the City Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their Pre-Trial Brief.[2][13] Subsequently, the corresponding Informations[3][14] were filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants[4][15] for the arrest of the petitioners.
[1][12] The dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, In view of all the foregoing, undersigned finds probable cause that the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents in evidence under par. 2, Article 172, RPC (4 counts) had been committed and that respondents Teodoro Borlongan, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa, and Arturo Manuel are probably guilty.
Let Informations be filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City of Bago, Philippines.
SO RESOLVED. (Id. at 110-114).
[2][13] Rollo, pp. 113-114.
[3][14] Id. at 115-122.
[4][15] Id. at 123-126.
Respondents move to quash the four (4) Information filed on the ground, among others, that "they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. They then argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal case should have been suspended on the ground that the issue being threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial question."
"In an Order[1][17] dated November 13, 1998, the court denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case — which fell within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, the court added, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue involved in the civil case was not a prejudicial question, and thus, denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal proceedings. Lastly, the court was convinced that the Informations contained all the facts necessary to constitute an offense.
Petitioners subsequently instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and TRO, before the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing and not recalling the warrants of arrest, reiterating the arguments in their omnibus motion.[2][18] They, likewise, questioned the court’s conclusion that by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to assail the validity of the warrant of arrest.
On June 20, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition.[3][19] Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners now raise before us the following issues:
A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause required for the filing of an Information in court?
If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause, should not the investigating prosecutor dismiss the complaint, or at the very least, require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit?
B.
Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the personal knowledge of the complainant be sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause?
C.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, and the record of the preliminary investigation does not show the existence of probable cause, should not the judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and dismiss the criminal case, or at the very least, require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit in order to aid the judge in determining the existence of probable cause?
D.
Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E.
Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable cause?[4][20]"
[1][17] The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For reinvestigation is hereby denied.
Set arraignment of the accused on December 1, 1998 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 143-150).
[2][18] Rollo, pp. 151-186.
[3][19] Supra note 1.
[4][20] Rollo, pp. 13-14.
On the issue, whether or not the Respondent is denied due process of law when he was not able to submit his Counter Affidavit because there was no Preliminary Investigation the Supreme Court ruled:
"As will be discussed below, the petitioners could not validly claim the right to preliminary investigation."
x x x x x x x
Petitioners were charged with the offense defined and penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172[1][35] of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty imposable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Clearly, the case is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and preliminary investigation is not mandatory.[2][36]
[1][35] Article 172.
x x x x
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
x x x x x x x x x
In light of the foregoing, it appears that the proper procedure was followed by the prosecutor in determining probable cause for the filing of the informations, and by the trial court judge in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest. To reiterate, preliminary investigation was not mandatory, and the submission of counter-affidavit was not necessary.
[2][36] Villanueva v. Judge Almazan, 384 Phil. 776, 784 (2000); Del Rosario, Jr. v. Judge Bartolome, 337 Phil. 330, 333 (1997).
The Honorable Supreme Court rationalized that "only in cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court" can there be a right to "Preliminary Investigation". (in the new Rule now, even cases cognizable by the first level courts, provided that the penalty is more than four (4) years, Preliminary Investigation is required, emphasis by LEGALHAWK)
Conversely, with that pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it can be said that the refusal to conduct Preliminary Investigation when validly invoked by a Respondent (like when he seasonably filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation within five (5) days from the filing of an Information as a result of an INQUEST and the court denies such MOTION) IS A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS (Rolito Go Case).
As to the definition (Rule of Thumb) of the "finding of Probable Cause" by the Prosecutor and the "finding of Probable Cause for the purpose of issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, Court ruled:
"True, a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be more than mere suspicion.[1][51] While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.[2][52] It is, therefore, imperative for the prosecutor to relieve the accused from the pain and inconvenience of going through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused."[3][53]
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.[1][38] It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted.[2][39] A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.[3][40]
On the other hand, we have defined probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.[4][41]
To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause. Otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor’s findings in such investigations.[5][42] In the same way, the general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.[6][43] It is only in exceptional cases when this Court may set aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice.[7][44] The facts obtaining in the present case warrant the application of the exception.
This case opens the eyes of the Prosecutor not to hide under the job of "finding probable cause" and let the Judge decide. When, in the finding of the Prosecutor, there is want evidence, the Supreme Court grants him that mantle of authority to dismiss the case. The Honorable Supreme Court gives the reason for this: "
"to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.[1][52] It is, therefore, imperative for the prosecutor to relieve the accused from the pain and inconvenience of going through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused."[2][53]
[1][52] Ching v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 164317, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 609, 629-630; Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163593, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 387, 410.
[2][53] R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 369, 395.
[1][38] Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 154239-41, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 533, 550.
[2][39] Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, June 1, 2007.
[3][40] Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 38.
[4][41] Id; Cuevas v. Muñoz, 401 Phil. 752, 773 (2000); Ho v. People, supra note 37, at 608.
[5][42] Ladlad v. Velasco, supra note 39.
[6][43] De Joya v. Marquez, G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 376, 381.
[7][44] Id.; Ladlad v. Velasco, supra note 39.
[1][51] See AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007; and Hon. Drilon v. CA, 327 Phil. 916, 922 (1996), where the Court found that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor in finding probable as the evidence, taken altogether constitute probable cause.
[2][52] Ching v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 164317, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 609, 629-630; Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163593, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 387, 410.
[3][53] R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 369, 395.
